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Biocontrol News and Information
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September 2004, Volume 25 No. 3
IPM Systems
This
section covers integrated
pest management (IPM)
including biological control,
and techniques that
are compatible with
the use of
biological control or
minimize negative impact
on natural enemies.
Learning from Failure
Two participants in a
smallholder IPM project in Malawi have written an account of its failures1. Far from being driven by disenchantment, this atypical project
output gives a useful assessment of the lessons that were learnt, and from
which future projects can plan. Given the acknowledged poor uptake of IPM
by smallholder farmers in Africa, this examination of the reasons for the
failings of an IPM project is an important addition "to the small but
growing literature that documents the learning process in technology
development with and for resource-poor farmers."
In fact 'failure' is hardly
a fair description of the Farming Systems IPM (FSIPM) project in southern
Malawi, which was funded by the UK Department for International
Development (DFID). It largely met its project objectives, but in their
paper the authors are assessing how far the project is likely to
contribute to its 'supergoal' of 'Improved incomes for resource-poor
farmers'. They say that although it is too early to make a formal
assessment, in their opinion it is unlikely to succeed in this sense.
The 3-year FSIPM project was
designed to a blueprint which assumed pests were the major constraint on
smallholder production. Reconnaissance surveys and on-farm trials showed
that this was not the case. The paper's authors (an agricultural economist
and an IPM specialist) argued that, in Malawi at least, smallholder IPM
will only be effective within the context of improving crop management
(e.g. improved fertility and better varieties) to increase yields. Without
higher yields there is no economic incentive for IPM. IPM strategies are
more likely to be accepted by farmers if they are clearly linked to
technologies which raise cash incomes.
It would be wrong to assume
that the project continued blithely without addressing the perceived
shortcomings as they became apparent. In fact, the project made the
learning process an integral part of the project, rather than leaving it
to later external review. During the project, which tested 18 IPM
strategies (including three farmer-developed strategies) against seven
major pests and diseases of maize, beans, pigeon pea and sweet potato,
'new learning' was identified at the end of each crop season, and both the
mistaken assumption that preceded it and the changes made to the project
as a result of the new learning were recorded. The recent paper summarizes
these into six lessons.
- The
project addressed the wrong problem. The assumption that crop
losses from pests were a critical constraint was incorrect. Although
the smallholder farmers of southern Malawi do experience severe losses
following pest outbreaks, this is less of an issue than poor soil
fertility and the high price of fertilizer. IPM can have a role, but
as one component of a broader integrated strategy to improve crop
productivity, not as a stand-alone solution for improving smallholder
livelihoods.
- Farmers
had little economic incentive for adopting IPM. Smallholders
everywhere need to perceive an economic benefit before they will adopt
a new farming technology. The assumption that the high costs of
pesticides would make IPM (with reduced pesticide applications)
economically attractive failed to take into account how little, if
any, pesticide farmers apply to food crops. IPM does have potential in
some vegetable cash crops where farmers are prepared to make greater
investments (in pesticides, weeding, etc.) but this needs to be
market-led and linked to wider efforts to raise productivity and
incomes. Varietal resistance and classical biological control are the
most attractive approaches from the farmers' point of view, since the
costs are borne by the national agricultural system.
- Pest
damage varied between sites and seasons. The project was designed
on the assumption that the target pests were equally serious
everywhere in every season, which they were not. As a consequence,
some of the on-farm trials gave inconclusive results. Reasons for
farmers overestimating pest incidence varied from confusion over names
to a wish to be included in a project that might provide valuable
inputs. The problem was exacerbated by the need to fulfil
socioeconomic targets for inclusion of different farming household
types.
- The
'basket' of technologies was almost empty. The project was
expected to test IPM technologies developed in earlier projects but
almost all of these proved inappropriate, so the project had the
additional task of developing alternatives to test. A common
misconception is that resource-poor farmers will adopt labour-intensive
IPM practices. New interventions may also not be adopted because they
conflict with something the farmer is already doing (whether or not it
is effective), or they may prove to be economically beneficial only
under certain circumstances (e.g. high pest pressure).
- Standard
research methods had their limitations. Statistical rigour and
verification did not fit easily into the context of testing IPM
strategies in the on-farm trials (especially in view of the problems
described above), and while qualitative approaches lend themselves
more easily to location-specific interventions and interventions that
vary with the pattern of events, they are difficult to validate.
Participatory rural appraisals (PRA) that use group discussion tended
to produce a "chorus line of mutually agreed responses", and
individual interviews provided better insight into how and why a
farmer chooses a particular course of action.
- Farmer
participation was not optimized. Farmers found it difficult to
assess the results of the on-farm trials; the factorial design
included several treatments on the same plot and farmers did not have
a directly comparable control to look at. Other interventions were
difficult for farmers to understand because of gaps in their knowledge
(e.g. about pest biology), and training in farmer field schools (FFS)
was not always enough to allow them to evaluate a strategy as well as
the researchers.
The paper goes on to discuss
why, despite identifying failings and making efforts to redesign the
project to meet farmers needs better, it still proved largely unsuccessful
in contributing to the supergoal. Some successes are also highlighted. Why
these succeeded where other interventions failed backs up the explanations
for the failures.
- An IPM
strategy needs to be market-led. In Malawi, pigeon pea has a
large internal market and export potential. Farmers ranked it as their
second most important cash crop, but Fusarium
wilt was identified as a constraint to production. One IPM option
assessed was planting with a new variety, ICEAP 00040. This proved to
have a promising combination of attributes: as well as good resistance
to Fusarium wilt, the new variety gave high yields with large seeds
that are easy to process and have good taste and colour. These
attributes led to a high demand for the new variety from processors
and consumers, and it was approved for release.
- IPM
needs to form part of improving crop management. Infestation by
the parasitic weed Striga is a symptom of low soil fertility. One of
the IPM strategies tested for its control involved green manures (Tephrosia
vogelii, Crotolaria ochroleuca). These
contributed directly to improving soil fertility and, although there
was no evidence that Striga incidence was
reduced, maize yields were increased. There is thus an economic
incentive for this IPM technique and work on it is continuing as part
of a soil fertility research programme.
The authors note that
project learning usually takes second place to technical results. Where
initial expectations are not met, donors and scientists are often reticent
about exploring what went wrong. However this paper draws out the
relevance of these issues for agricultural research with African
smallholders in the firm belief that "a fertile error is better than
a sterile truth."
1Orr, A.; Ritchie, J.M.
(2004) Learning from failure: smallholder farming systems and IPM in
Malawi. Agricultural Systems 79: 31–54.
(Available online at www.sciencedirect.com)
Web: www.nri.org/research/farmsys-ipm.htm
Contact: Alastair Orr,
Natural Resources Institute, Chatham Maritime, Kent ME4 4TB, UK.
Email: A.W.Orr@gre.ac.uk
Mark Ritchie, The Old
Cottage, Upper Street, Hollingbourne, Kent ME17 1 UJ, UK.
Email: JMarkRitchie@compuserve.com
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